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A.  Introduction 
European lawyers, at least those dealing predominantly with institutional 
matters, are living particularly interesting times since the setting-up of the 
“European Convention on the Future of Europe” in December 2001.
1 As the 
Convention’s mandate, spelled out in rather broad terms in the European 
Council’s declaration of Laeken,
2 is potentially unlimited, and as the future 
constitution of the European Union (EU) will be ultimately adopted by the 
subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), there appears to be a great 
possibility to clarify, to simplify and also to reform many of the more 
controversial elements in the European legal construction. 
The present debate on the future of the European constitution also highlights 
the relationship between the pouvoir constituant
3 and the European Courts, the 
                                                 
* Dr. iur. (Mainz), Docteur en droit (Liège) ; Professor, College of Europe (Bruges) ; Senior 
Researcher, Institute of European Legal Studies, University of Liège. This paper has been 
written in the framework of the “Interuniversitary Attraction Pole” (IAP P5/32), a research 
programme focussing on the Law of European Integration initiated by the Belgian Federal 
Government and carried out by the European Institutes of the Universities of Liège, Ghent, 
Brussels (ULB) and Paris (Institut d’Etudes Politiques). Thanks to Donald Slater for valuable 
comments on some of the issues discussed. All shortcomings of this note are, of course, mine. 
1 On the Convention’s work so far see e.g. J.-V. Louis, “ La convention et l'avenir de l'Union 
européenne”, (2002) Cahiers de droit européen, 235 et seq.; “Editorial comments: The sixteen 
articles: On the way to a European Constitution”, (40) Common Market Law Review 247 et seq.; 
S. Hobe, “Bedingungen, Verfahren und Chancen europäischer Verfassungsgebung: Zur Arbeit 
des Brüsseler Verfassungskonvent”, (2003) Europarecht, 1 et seq. – See also the contributions 
in B. de Witte (ed.), Ten Reflections on the Constitutional Treaty for Europe (E-Book published 
by the European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole 2003, at 
http://www.iue.it/AEL/Ten%20Reflections%20on%20the%20Constitutional%20Treaty%20for%2
0Europe.shtml ) 
2 See http://europe.eu.int/futurum/documents/offtext/doc151201_en.htm . 
3 The term “pouvoir constituant” is not (yet) commonly accepted in the context of the EU. On the 
one hand, this is due to the fact that some still question that the EU has (or can ever) have a   3   
Court of Justice (ECJ) and its Court of First Instance (CFI), who have to 
interpret the basic rules and principles of the EU.
4 
In that light, the present article will focus on a classic theme of the Court’s case 
law: the relationship between judges and pouvoir constituant. In the EU, this 
relationship has traditionally been marked by the ECJ’s role as driving force in 
the “constitutionalisation” of the EC Treaties  – which has, to a large extent, 
been accepted and even codified by the Member States in subsequent treaty 
revisions. However, since 1994, the ECJ appears to be more reluctant to act as 
a “law-maker.”
5 The recent judgment in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA)
6 
– an important decision by which the ECJ refused to liberalize individuals’ 
access to the Community Courts – is also interesting in this context. UPA may 
be seen as another proof of  judicial restraint  - or even as indicator of the 
beginning of a new phase in the “constitutional dialogue” between the ECJ and 
the “Masters of the Treaties.” 
                                                                                                                                               
constitution – although one cannot seriously deny that the EU Treaties form the constitution of 
the public power it institute (constitution i n the material sense). On the other hand, this 
constitution takes the form of an international agreement concluded among the EU Member 
States and ratified by their peoples and/or their representatives in the national parliaments. 
There is, thus, no “European people” which could be regarded as the pouvoir constituant in the 
classical sense as to be found in nation states. However, the traditional concepts developed for 
the latter do not fit to the new form of institutionalised public power which has been instituted by 
the EU Treaties. The classical constitutional concepts have, thus, to be adapted to this new 
reality. If one accepts this, which does not equate the EU to a traditional state, it is possible to 
consider the EU Treaties as the the Union’s Constitution and the Member States revising these 
Treaties according to Article 48 EU as the Union’s pouvoir constituant. – See e.g. J. Gerkrath, 
L’emergence d’un droit constitutionnel pour l’Europe (Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels 
1997); M. Andenas, “Can Europe have a Constitution?”, in: D. Melissas/I. Pernice (eds.), 
Perspectives of the Nice Treaty and the IGC in 2004 (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2002), 102; J.-C. 
Piris, “L’Union européenne at-elle une constitution? Lui faut-il une?”, (1999) Revue trimestrielle 
de droit européen 599; A. Auer, “L’adoption et la révision des constitutions”, in: R. Bieber/P. 
Widmer (eds.), L’éspace constitutionnel européen (Schulthess, Zürich 1995), 267; H. J. Boehl, 
Verfassungsgebung im Bundesstaat  (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1997);  M. Duverger, “Le 
pouvoir constituant dans l’Union européenne”, in: European University Institute (ed.),  A 
Constitution for the European Union?  (Working Paper RSC 95/9, San Domenico di Fiesole 
1995). 
4 Art. 220 EC (and Art. 47 EU) confers to the Court of Justice a broad task by stating that it 
“shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed”. Today 
the ECJ acts as constitutional court, administrative court, penal/disciplinary court, civil court, 
arbitration court and – since the establishment of the Court of First Instance – also as appellate 
court. 
5 This term has been used by V. Constantinesco, “The ECJ as a Law-Maker: Praeter aut Contra 
Legem?”, in: D. O’Keeffe & A. Bavasso (eds.), Judicial Review in European Union Law. Liber 
Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley (Kluwer, The Hague 2000), 73 et seq. 
6 Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA), Judgment of 25 July 2002, nyp in the 
ECR, the text is available at http://curia.eu.int/en/jurisp/index.htm .   4   
B.  “Constitutional Dialogue” in the EU 
I.  Treaty Reform as a Form of “Constitutional Dialogue” 
Conflicts of interests, powers, and competences are often the main focus of 
writings on the relationship between the EU and its Member States in general 
and between the ECJ and national supreme/constitutional courts in particular. 
This sometimes obscures the fact that conflict resolution is, to a large extent, 
“daily business” in multi-level (federal) systems which are in constant search 
and permanent (re-)adjustment of the “federal balance.” Hence, some authors 
have tried to apply deliberative theories to the EU and to interpret conflicts 
between center and periphery as “constitutional conversations” or “constitutional 
dialogues.” According to these theories, such d ialogues serve to uncover 
divergences within the  “layered” constitutional system of the EU in order to 
achieve a greater convergence.
7 
Although adopting a cautious approach towards applying such theories to the 
EU, the scholar and commentator B. De Witte has recently identified the “semi-
permanent treaty revision process” as the “closest thing to a constitutional 
conversation in Europe.”
8 In fact, the Member States are the sole “Masters of 
the Treaties” (Article 48 EU). As such they have been negotiating, continuously 
for more than a decade, in successive Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs)
9 
and trying to develop further the Union’s constitutional order.
10 In contrast to the 
Member States, the supranational EU institutions, the Commission and 
European Parliament (EP), do not have formal decision-making powers in the 
                                                 
7 N. Walker, “Flexibility within a Metaconstitutional Frame: Reflections on the Future of Legal 
Authority in Europe”, in: G. De Búrca & J. Scott (eds.), Constitutional Change in the EU: From 
Uniformity to Flexibility  (Hart, OUP, Oxford 2000), 9 et seq. (at 21) distinguishes “judicial 
conversations” between the ECJ and national courts and “political conversations” between 
Member States in Intergovernmental Conferences and within the EU institutions. Critical on the 
existence of “judicial conversations”  B. De Witte, “The Closest Thing to a Constitutional 
Conversation in Europe: The Semi-Permanent Treaty Revision Process”, in: P. Beaumont/C. 
Lyons/N. Walker (eds.),  Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law  (Hart, OUP, 
Oxford 2002), 39 et seq. (at 40/41). 
8 De Witte (previous note) at 42. 
9 IGC 1990/91 (Maastricht Treaty), IGC 1996/97 (Amsterdam Treaty), IGC 2000 (Nice Treaty). 
The next IGC is scheduled for 2004 but may perhaps take place already in 2003. 
10 Government representatives are the main actors in an IGC. However, also other national 
instances take part: national parliaments, “regional”  parliaments and governments, public 
opinions and national constitutional courts. Their power stems from the fact that ratification of 
treaty amendments may require their assent. See for details De Witte (note 7) at 48/49.   5   
treaty revision process and are, hence, limited to various forms of more subtle 
political persuasion.
11 
 
II.  “Constitutional Dialogue” Between the ECJ and the Union’s Pouvoir 
Constituant 
Thus, one may ask how the ECJ can manage to enter into a “constitutional 
debate” on Treaty revision and constitution-making which is dominated by the 
different national - and to some extent also supranational - political “players.” 
1.  The Traditional Approach: ECJ Acts, Pouvoir Constituant Accepts 
More than the other supranational EU institutions, the ECJ has the power to 
interpret Treaty provisions  – and to give them a meaning which was not 
intended by the pouvoir constituant. This allows the ECJ to enter with the latter 
into a special form of “constitutional dialogue.” 
For many years, this dialogue was characterized by the fact that the judiciary 
enjoyed a kind of “strategic advantage”: the “Masters of the Treaty” were to 
accept every step undertaken by the ECJ in further developing the Treaty text 
into a constitution
12 as long as they did not themselves manage a unanimous 
Treaty amendment.
13 
This is not to say that the Union’s pouvoir constituant always opposed judicial 
constitutional developments. On the contrary,
14 most of the ECJ’s developments 
have been accepted by the Member States, some of them have even been 
formally codified by subsequent Treaty revisions. 
                                                 
11  See  De Witte (note 7) at 47. The Commission was influential in the IGCs 1985/86 and 
1990/91 while the EP did particularly well in the IGC 1996/97. 
12 Direct applicability of treaty provisions, primacy, the doctrines of implicit and parallel external 
competences, direct applicability of directives, Member State liability for breaches of EC law. 
13 This explains why the UK government tried to  reduce considerably the powers of the ECJ 
during the IGC 1996/97 and why the Member States have been very reserved on extending the 
ECJ’s powers to fields as internal security and immigration. 
14 During many years, Member States felt no need to oppose themselves to the judge-driven 
“constitutionalization” of the Treaties since as each single government remained, thanks to the 
so-called  Luxembourg compromise, “Master of the decision-making process”. On this see 
J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ 100 (1991) Yale Law Journal 2403 et seq.   6   
2.  First Signs of Change: the Pouvoir Constituant Reacts 
Although the Union’s  pouvoir constituant has a ccepted some of the ECJ’s 
“proposals” for Treaty reform and even “codified” some of them in different 
revision treaties, the “Masters of the Treaties” have, during the last decade, also 
signaled some change regarding their perception of the Court’s “law-making” 
stature. 
Recent Treaty revisions also contained provisions, which made clear that the 
pouvoir constituant was not ready to accept all “proposals” made by the ECJ. 
Two examples serve to illustrate this point. The Single European Act excluded 
the application of the doctrine of parallel external powers in the field of 
environmental protection. The Treaty of Maastricht even contains two special 
provisions limiting the possible effects of one of the ECJ’s judgments, which the 
Member States disliked.
15 
More generally, the Member States have demonstrated their awareness of the 
Court’s powers in the constitutional field by excluding and limiting these powers 
from some of the new spheres of competence conferred to the Union by the 
Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam. 
3.  A More Cautious Approach: ECJ and the Limits of EU Powers 
The aforementioned reactions of the Union’s pouvoir constituant and growing 
criticisms  – expressed by academia but also by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court – denouncing the ECJ’s “judicial activism” led the ECJ to 
adopt a more cautious approach. 
Three landmark decisions issued during the last years may be seen as 
indicating the judges’ turn towards a case law which pays heed to growing 
national concerns about the ECJ’s role as a “law maker.” 
                                                 
15 See Protocol No. 2 (ad Article 119 EC) intending to limit the effects of Barber and Protocol 
No. 17 limiting those of Grogan. See on this M. Fernández-Salas, “De la possibilité de renverser 
l’arrêt ‘Bosman’ par une modification du traité”, (1996) Revue du marché unique européen 155 
at 167 et seq.   7   
In  Keck,
16 the ECJ tried to limit somewhat the wide scope it had previously 
given to Article 28 EC which grants the free movement of goods within the EU.  
In  Opinion 1/94,
17 the Court refused to extend the scope of the common 
commercial policy – and, hence of the EC competences - to trade in services, 
although such a “dynamic” and functional interpretation of Article 133 EC would 
have been both possible and, it is suggested, perfectly consistent with the ratio 
legis of the EC Treaty. 
In Ban of Tobacco Advertising,
18 the ECJ decided to apply strictly the conditions 
contained in Article 95 EC, which is the main EU power allowing for the 
harmonization of Member State regulations which hamper  the establishment 
and/or the functioning of the internal market. 
In each of these cases the ECJ reduced - or refrained from fully exploiting - the 
potential scope of important Treaty provisions. They appear, thus, to provide – 
at least partially  - an answer to the criticisms formulated by some scholars, 
national courts, and even the Union’s pouvoir constituant. The ECJ indicated 
with these decisions that it is capable of and ready to refrain from a more 
dynamic interpretation of EU primary law - which has much helped to stabilize 
the “European project” during its first decades of existence - and instead to 
adopt a stricter, more text-oriented approach.
19 
 
C.  The UPA Judgment: A New Example of Judicial Self-restraint ? 
The  UPA judgment issued on July 25, 2002  - which became, somewhat 
unexpectedly, one of the most important cases decided by the ECJ during the 
last year - may be read as a new step in the ECJ’s move away from its previous 
“law maker”-stature. 
                                                 
16 Cases C-267 and 268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR 6097. 
17 Opinion 1/94 WTO [1994] ECR I-5267. 
18 Case C-376/98 Germany/Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419. 
19 This does not preclude that the Court has abandoned at all to foster “negative integration” 
e.g. in national social security systems (see, among others, Case C -157/99  Smits and 
Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5773 and the article of E. Steyger, “National Health Care Systems 
Under Fire (but not too heavily)”, 29/1 (2002) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 97 et seq.   8   
In order to analyze the extent to which the  UPA judgment may be a new 
example of judicial self-restraint (the theme discussed in section V. below), I will 
briefly outline the facts of the case (section I.) and the main legal problem raised 
by the case (section II.), describe the reform proposals and the position adopted 
by the ECJ (section III.) and assess the Court’s solution of the problem (section 
IV.). 
 
I.  Facts 
An association of Spanish farmers ( UPA) sought the annulment of an EC 
regulation which discontinued an agricultural aid scheme and which did not 
require a national application measure. As the CFI rejected the action on 
grounds of standing, UPA appealed to the ECJ.
20 The Court’s Advocate 
General (AG Jacobs)
21 took the opportunity to renew his earlier proposal and to 
invite the ECJ to review its relatively restrictive  – and much criticized  - 
interpretation of Article 230 (4) EC in order to facilitate individuals’ standing 
before the European Courts.
22 
The Court’s UPA judgment in the case was eagerly awaited for two reasons. 
First, AG Jacobs had advocated for a revision of the Court’s traditional case law 
on the sensible matter of individual standing. Second, and more important, the 
CFI had backed AG Jacobs’s reform proposals by itself relaxing the traditional 
standing requirements in its judgment Jégo-Quéré.
23 One could, thus, wonder 
how the ECJ would react.
24 
                                                 
20 See Art. 225 (1) EC: “A Court of First Instance shall be attached to the Court of Justice with 
jurisdiction to hear  and determine at first instance, subject to a right of appeal to the Court of 
Justice on points of law only …” 
21 See Art. 222 (2) EC: “It shall be the duty of the Advocate-General, acting with complete 
impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions on cases brought 
before the Court of Justice, in order to assist the Court …” 
22 Article 230(4) EC reads as follows: “Any natural or legal person may … institute proceedings 
against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of 
a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the 
former.” On the narrow interpretation see infra subsection II.1. 
23 Case T -177/01  Jégo-Quéré et Cie/Commission of 3 May 2002 (available at 
http://curia.eu.int/en/cp/aff/cp0241en.htm . This case has already been commented by several 
authors (partly together with the UPA judgment), see e.g. F. Berrod/F. Mariate, “Le pourvoi dans 
l’affaire Unión de Pequeños Agricultores c./ Conseil: le retour de la procession d’Echternach”,   9   
The ECJ decided to reject the reform proposals and to maintain its traditional 
interpretation of the standing requirements in Article 230 (4) EC. 
 
II.  The Problem of Individuals’ Access to the European Courts 
Private applicants’ locus standi before the ECJ has been, for many years now, a 
hotly debated issue, in particular as the Court's case law is widely considered 
as being too restrictive.
25 
1.  No Standing When Challenging the Legality of EC Regulations and 
Directives 
                                                                                                                                               
(2002) 10 Europe 7 et seq.; D. Hanf, “Facilitating Private Applicants' Access to the European 
Courts ? On the Possible Impact of the CFI's Ruling in Jégo-Quéré”, 3 (2002)  German Law 
Journal 7; id., “ Kicking the ball into the Member States’ field: the Court’s response to Jégo-
Quéré”, 3 (2002)  German Law Journal 8; T. Lübig, “Anmerkung Jégo-Quéré”, (2002) 
Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 532 et seq.; J.-P. Jacquet, “La protection 
juridictionnelle des droits fondamentaux dans l’Union européenne”, (2002) Actualité juridique – 
droit administrative 476 et seq.; F. Malvasio, “Débat sur l’accès des particuliers au prétoire 
communautaire”, (2002)  Actualité juridique  – droit administrative 867 et seq.; M. Nettesheim, 
“Effektive Rechtsschutzgewährleistung im arbeitsteiligen System europäischen 
Rechtsschutzes”, (2002) Juristenzeitung 928 et seq.; H.-P. Schneider, “Es gibt noch Richter in 
Luxemburg”, (2002)  Neue Juristische Wochenschrift  2927 et seq.; D. Slater, “Chronique. 
Contentieux. Arrêt Jégo-Quéré” in (2002) Revue du droit de l’Union européenne 391 et seq.; D. 
Waelbroeck, “Le droit au recours juridictionnel effectif du particulier. Trois pas en avant, deux en 
arrière”, (2002) 1/2 Cahiers de droit européen 3 et seq.; J.-D. Braun/M. Kettner, “Die Absage 
des EuGH an eine richterrechtliche Reform des EG-Rechtsschutzsystems - "Plaumann" auf 
immer und ewig?”, (2003) Die öffentliche Verwaltung 58 et seq.; N. van den Broek, “A Long Hot 
Summer for Individual Concern? The European Court’s Recent Case Law on Direct Actions by 
Private Parties … and a Plea for a Foreign Affairs Exception” 30 (2003)  Legal Issues of 
Economic Integration, 61 et seq. 
24 On the “dialogue” between the CFI and the ECJ see e.g. A. Arnull, “Interpretation and 
Precedent in European Community Law”, in: A. Barav/D.A. Wyatt (eds.), 14 (1994) Yearbook of 
European Law (Clarendon, Oxford 1995), 115 et seq. (at 125 et seq.). 
25 See e.g. A. Barav, ‘Direct and Individual Concern: An Almost Insurmountable Barrier to the 
Admissibility of Individual Appeal to the EEC Court', 11 (1974)  Common Market Law Review 
191 et seq.; H. Rasmussen, ‘Why is Article 173 Interpreted against Private Plaintiffs?', 5 (1980) 
European Law Review 112 et seq.; A. Arnull, ‘Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment 
under Article 173 of the EC Treaty', 32 (1995)  Common Market Law Review 7 et seq.; D. 
Waelbroeck/A.-M. Verheyden, ‘Les conditions de recevabilité des recours en annulation des 
particuliers contre les actes normatifs communautaires à la lumière du droit compare et de la 
Convention des droits de l'homme', (1995)  Cahiers de droit européen, 399 et seq.; F. 
Schockweiler, “L’accès à la justice dans l’ordre juridique communautaire”, (1996) Journal des 
Tribunaux – droit européen 1 et seq.; P. Craig/G. De Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials 
(3
rd Ed., OUP, Oxford 2002), 482 et seq.; C. Harlow, ‘Access to Justice as a Human Right: The 
European Convention and the European Union', in: P. Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights 
(OUP, Oxford 1999), 187 et seq.; B. De Witte, ‘The Past and Future Role of the European Court 
of Justice in the Protection of Human Rights', in: P. Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights 
(OUP, Oxford 1999), 859 et seq. – The Court's restrictive approach is defended by P. Nihoul, 
‘La recevabilité des recours en annulation introduits par un particulier à l'encontre d'un acte 
communautaire de portée générale', 30 (1994) Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 171 et seq.   10   
At the price of some oversimplification, one can summarise the Court's case law 
as follows. Private applicants are allowed to challenge individual or 
administrative measures of the Community which concern them  directly  and 
individually.
26 However, the Court does not normally recognise such a direct 
and individual concern when applicants seek to challenge general normative 
(“legislative”) EC acts.
27 
The ECJ has allowed individuals to challenge only some very specific 
categories of general normative acts, e.g. when the applicant has been named 
in a regulation or when the legislative act has been adopted with regard to 
particular individuals, as frequently happens in anti-dumping measures.
28 Thus, 
the applicant challenging a general legislative measure has standing only when 
that person or firm can successfully establish that the contested act “disguises” 
what is, in fact, an individual measure. 
In spite of some judgments adopting a slightly more liberal stance on an 
individual’s standing,
29 the ECJ has maintained its restrictive approach with 
regard to the interpretation of the notion of “individual concern” of Article 230 (4) 
EC, which it developed in the early 1960s.
30 When the incriminated measure 
“applies to objectively determined situations and produces legal effects with 
regard to categories of persons  described in a generalized and abstract 
manner” the Court does not recognise an individual concern – regardless of “the 
                                                 
26 See Article 230 (4) EC quoted supra note 22. 
27  The leading case is Case 25/62  Plaumann  [1963] ECR 197 but  see also Case 16/62 
Confédération nationale des producteurs de fruits et legumes [1962] ECR 901 and Case 307/81 
Alusuisse [1982] ECR 3463. 
28  For an overview on this case law  see e.g. P. Nihoul, ‘La recevabilité des recours en 
annulation introduits par un particulier à l'encontre d'un acte communautaire de portée 
générale', 30 (1994) RTD eur. 171 et seq. and T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European 
Community Law  (4th ed., OUP, Oxford 1998) at 355 et seq. 
29 see Case C -309/89  Codorniu [1994] ECR I -1853, but also the Anti-dumping Case C-358/89 
Extramet [1991] ECR I-2501 is often cited in this context. 
30 P. Craig/G. De Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials (3
rd Ed., OUP, Oxford 2002), 496 
et seq. differentiate between three approaches: ‘infingement of rights or breach of a duty’ 
approach (ex.: Case C -309/89  Codorniu [1994] ECR I -1853 and Cases T -480 and 483/93 
Antillean Rice [1995] ECR II-2305), ‘degree of factual injury’ approach ( ex.: Case C -358/89 
Extramet [1991] ECR I-2501) and ‘pure Plaumann’ approach (ex.: C-209/94 P Buralux [1996] 
ECR I-615), the latter being the ‘default position’ (at 500).   11   
mere fact that it is possible to determine the number or even the identity of the 
producers” concerned by the general measure.
31 
Historically, the ECJ’s approach can be explained by the fact that the drafters of 
the EEC Treaty decided, under German influence, to endorse a more restrictive 
standard on locus standi than they had done in the preceding ECSC Treaty.
32 
One has also to understand that the ECJ showed little enthusiasm for allowing – 
at least in the founding phase of the Community  - individuals to challenge 
legislation that was the result of difficult political compromises reached within 
the Council under the rule of unanimity.
33 Furthermore, a restrictive approach on 
standing allowed not only the ECJ to avoid having to exercise control over 
norms of a discretionary nature - in particular in the sensible field of common 
agricultural policy – but also to filter incoming actions.
34 
2.  The Dogmatic Foundation of the Court's Approach: A Complete System of 
Remedies Granted by the Cooperation Between the ECJ and National Courts 
The Court has continuously justified its restrictive approach to the standing of 
individuals by reference to what the Court refers to as the complete system of 
remedies created by the EC Treaty. 
Accordingly, no Community measure can escape judicial control as to its 
conformity with the Treaty because a measure may be challenged either 
through a direct action based on Article 230 (4) EC or through a preliminary 
                                                 
31 Quotation from Cases 789 and 790/79 Calpak [1980] ECR 1949 at 9, but see also the ‘post- 
Codorniu' Case T-472/93 Campo Ebro [1996] ECR II-421. 
32 Although this decision reflects also the difference between the ECSC Treaty (being a “traité-
loi”) and the EEC Treaty (being a “traité-cadre”). On this and the influence of the stricter German 
approach see M. Fromont, ‘L'influence du droit français et du droit allemand sur les conditions 
de recevabilité du recours en annulation devant la Cour de Justice des Communautés 
européennes', 3 (1966) RTD eur. 47 et seq. 
33 It may be worth to quote AG Lagrange who stated, back in 1962, that the restrictive approach 
laid down in the Treaty and reinforced by the Court’s interpretation was supported by “… the 
extremely grave consequences that would follow from even a partial annulment of the 
regulations. As it is well known, particularly in the case of agricultural regulations, these texts 
have been arrived at only after considerable difficulty, and sometimes after a compromise 
reached in the Council, still wedded to the rule of unanimity.”  See Cases 16 and 17/62 
Producteurs de fruits/Council [1962] ECR 481 at 486. 
34 see, for a comprehensive discussion of the different policy arguments concerning standing of 
individuals, e.g. P. Craig/G. De Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials (2nd ed., OUP, 
Oxford 1998), 479 et seq.   12   
procedure pursuant to Article 234 EC.
35 Thus, “the Treaty established a 
complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to permit the 
Court of Justice to review the legality of measures by the institutions.”
36 
Putting it simply, the Court has relied on the following reasoning: a restrictive 
interpretation of Article 230 (4) EC limiting an individual’s standing does not 
create a real lacuna in judicial protection because individuals have the option of 
bringing actions against national application or implementation measures of the 
EC before the national courts, which have the obligation, according to Article 
234 and the ECJ’s  Foto Frost  case law,
37 to refer questions concerning the 
validity of EC acts to the Court.
38 
3.  Criticism of the Court’s Dogmatic Approach 
Critics of the Court's approach
39 argue that the Treaty's system of remedies is in 
fact not as complete as the ECJ suggests. 
In fact, there appear to be several lacunae in the system of judicial protection as 
defined by the Court. There are situations in which the procedure for preliminary 
rulings laid down in Article 234 EC does not provide individuals judicial 
protection at all or only at a high (viz inacceptable) price.
40 The three most 
important arguments in this context are the following: 
                                                 
35 Article 234 EC reads as follows: “The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give 
preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of this Treaty ; (b) the validity and 
interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and of the ECB ; (c) the interpretation 
of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, where the statutes so provide. 
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or 
tribunal may, if it considers that a decision is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request 
the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.” 
36 Case 294/83 Les Verts [1986] ECR 1339. 
37 Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199. 
38 This view is supported by P. Nihoul, ‘La recevabilité des recours en annulation introduits par 
un particulier à l'encontre d'un acte communautaire de portée générale', 30 (1994) RTD eur. 
171 et seq. who argues that this form of ‘decentralised' judicial control is also in line with the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
39 See the authors cited, supra  (note 19, with the exception of P. Nihoul) and AG Jacobs who 
expressed his concerns already prior to the  UPA in his opinion delivered in Case C -358/89 
Extramet [1991] ECR I-2501. 
40 see on this e.g. D. Waelbroeck/A.-M. Verheyden, ‘Les conditions de recevabilité des recours 
en annulation des particuliers contre les actes normatifs communautaires à la lumière du droit 
compare et de la Convention des droits de l'homme', (1995) Cahiers de droit européen, at 433 
et seq.   13   
First, one has to bear in mind that an Article 234 procedure requires – in most 
national legal systems - a national implementation measure and is, thus, often 
not available in those cases in which an individual seeks to challenge a directly 
applicable EC act which does not require implementation measures.
41 In such 
cases, the interested individual only has the possibility of provoking an 
infringement against the directly applicable act, which may then allow a 
challenge to  the enforcement measure or sanction imposed either by the 
Community or by a Member State administration.
42 
Second, forcing private litigants to pass through the national courts in order to 
have access to the European Courts may prove to be extremely costly  - both 
with regard to time and money. 
Third, the procedure under Article 234 makes private applicants' access to the 
European Courts, to a large degree, dependent upon the national courts' 
willingness to make use of this procedure. 
In sum, one cannot deny that the Court's restrictive approach towards individual 
standing under Article 230 (4) EC reduces, in determined situations, a citizen’s 
access to justice. Some observers believe that this limitation may well be 
contrary to the general principle of access to justice - as laid down in Articles 13 
and 6 of the ECHR,
43 in Article 47 of the (still not legally binding) Charter of 
Fundamental Rights
44 and which the ECJ itself has recognized in Les Verts.
45 
                                                 
41 For an example see Art. 13 of the Television without Frontiers Directive cited by B. De Witte, 
‘The Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Human Rights', 
in: P. Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 1999), at 876. 
42 The enforcement EC measure can be challenged according to Art. 230 (4) EC, a Member 
State measure according to national procedural law. 
43  Which the ECJ respects in line with Article 6 (2) EU. The compatibility of the ECJ’s 
interpretation of Article 230 (4) EC  with Article 6 ECHR the is developed by D. Waelbroeck/A.-
M. Verheyden, ‘Les conditions de recevabilité des recours en annulation des particuliers contre 
les actes normatifs communautaires à la lumière du droit compare et de la Convention des 
droits de l'homme', (1995) Cahiers de droit européen, at 425 et seq. 
44 Which states that everyone “… has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal …” 
(para. 1) and “…is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time …” Note, 
however, that according to the “official explanations” (written by the  Praesidium of the 
Convention which elaborated the Charter, see  http://ue.eu.int/df/default.asp?lang=en ) “[t]he 
inclusion of this precedent in the Charter is not intended to change the appeal system laid down 
by the Treaties, and particularly the rules relating to admissibility. This principle is therefore to 
be implemented according to the procedures laid down in the Treaties”. 
45 see Case 194/83 Les Verts [1986] ECR 1365 at 23.   14   
III.  Reform Proposals and the ECJ’s Position 
While the reform proposals made by AG Jacobs and the CFI advocated a 
relaxation of the standing requirements, the ECJ preferred to maintain the 
traditional, limited conception described above. 
1.  AG Jacobs in UPA and the CFI in Jégo-Quéré: Relaxing the Standing 
Requirements 
Confronted with individual requests for judicial review of directly applicable EC 
acts, which appeared not to be challengeable before national courts, both AG 
Jacobs in  UPA  and the CFI in  Jégo-Quéré proposed to operate a radical 
change in the Court’s case law and to soften the strict interpretation of the 
notion of  “individual concern” contained in Article 230 (4) EC. 
AG Jacobs’ proposal was less radical. He stated that: 
 “… it should therefore be accepted that a person is to be regarded as 
individually concerned by a Community measure where, by reason of his 
particular circumstances, the measure has, or is liable to have, a substantial 
adverse effect on his interests.”
 46 
The CFI proposed that: 
 “… a natural or legal person is to be regarded as individually concerned by a 
Community measure of general application that concerns him directly if the 
measure in question affects his legal position, in a manner which is both definite 
and immediate, by restricting his rights or by imposing obligations on him. The 
number and position of other persons who are likewise affected by the 
measure, or who may be so, are of no relevance in that regard.”
 47 
Both proposals sought liberalize the interpretation of individual concern. While 
the CFI would have required  that  the incriminated measure affect the 
applicant’s “legal position,” AG Jacobs’ formula referred only to the applicant’s 
“interests.” On the other hand, the AG would have demanded that the measure 
                                                 
46 AG Jacobs C-50/00 P UPA at 60. 
47 Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré at 51.   15   
have a “substantial adverse effect” while the CFI accepted a “ definite and 
immediate” restriction. It is difficult to assess the differences between the 
proposals. These differences depend upon the exact definition of the notions 
employed – in particular those of “legal position” and “interests” - which are, 
however, not more fully articulated by the AG and the CFI. 
These proposals marked, however, a very interesting stage in the European 
Courts’ search for the proper definition of individual standing. Both 
interpretations aim at abandoning the focus on the drafting and on the possible 
addressees of the EC act under review – a perspective which has too often 
proven to lead to rather unconvincing results.
48 Instead, they suggest that the 
“standing test” should analyse, when assessing the individual concern of an 
applicant, the specific applicant's situation under the contested act. 
2.  The ECJ in UPA: Maintaining the Restrictive Approach to Individual Standing 
The ECJ refused to follow these proposals and to soften the standing 
requirements as they have been developed in the Court’s case law interpreting 
the notion of “individual concern” contained in Article 230 (4) EC.
49 Instead, the 
Court continues to insist on the “cooperation model” of judicial protection in the 
EU as established  by the EC Treaty and its  complete system of judicial 
remedies. 
In spite of this “conservative” approach, the ECJ did not deny the assertions of 
AG Jacobs and the CFI according to which there lacunae do (or may) exist in 
the EU’s present system of judicial protection. However, the ECJ refused to 
avoid them by means of a revirement de jurisprudence, instead assigning  this 
duty to the Member States: 
“[I]t is for the Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and 
procedures which ensure respect for the right to effective judicial protection. In 
that context, in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in 
Article 5 of the Treaty [now: Article 10 EC], national courts are required, so far 
as possible, to interpret and apply national procedural rules governing the 
                                                 
48 See on this the authors quoted supra note 25. 
49 Case C-50/00 P UPA at 43.   16   
exercise of rights of action in a way that enables natural and legal persons to 
challenge before the Courts the legality of any decision or other national 
measure relative to the application to them of a Community act of general 
application … .”
50 
 
IV.  Assessing the ECJ Approach: Centralized or Decentralized System of 
Judicial Protection for Individuals ? 
The ECJ did not accept the reform proposals but preferred the traditional 
conception of a decentralized system of judicial protection for individuals. At first 
glance, the ECJ appears to have opted for a regressive and one-sided solution 
which  - instead of taking the way of a fresh innovation  – favours a rather 
inefficient mechanism promoting the proliferation of  lacunae in judicial 
protection at the expense of individuals. The Court’s decision can be labelled 
regressive and one-sided because it appears to immunize the EC law-maker 
from strict judicial review,  in spite of the fact that the ECJ has rarely shown 
reluctance when it came to establishing judicial safeguards for individuals 
against Member State acts, which are liable to violate Community law.  The 
decision can be termed  inefficient, on the other hand, because  national courts, 
to which an applicant must first make an appeal, will nonetheless be obliged to 
refer questions on the validity of EC acts to the ECJ. The Court’s decision 
accomplishes all of this while at the same time endangering fundamental rights 
because (efficient) judicial protection may be left too much to the discretion of 
national judicial systems and/or the “sensibility” of national judges. 
On closer inspection, the ECJ’s approach may, however, present fewer 
shortcomings than the more radical solution of centralizing the judicial 
protection of individuals at the EU level. The Court’s solution requires, however, 
some further clarifications in order for it to work in a satisfactory manner and to 
grant effective judicial protection. 
1.  The Reform Proposals in the Light of the ECJ’s Functional Limits 
                                                 
50 Case C-50/00 P UPA at 41 and 42.   17   
Relaxing standing requirements would allow individuals to avoid the “national 
track” and instead challenge EC acts directly before the ECJ. As already noted, 
such a centralization of judicial review is advocated, first, in order to enhance 
efficiency (as the detour via the national judge is a waste of time and resources) 
and, second, in order to reduce the risk that the existence of judicial protection 
is left to the discretion of the national court. 
However, one has to bear in mind that the capacities of the ECJ are limited. The 
Court already suffers some from a crowded docket,  which will certainly 
increase as a result of the future constitutional reforms and the next 
enlargements.
51 There are good reasons to consider that the ECJ’s capacities 
will not be enhanced to match the expansion of its jurisdiction and mandate.
52 
Hence, advocating an improvement in individuals' access – a centralization in 
the name of effective judicial protection - may well prove to have unexpected 
results. There is a risk that overburdening the ECJ might lead to longer delays 
and, in the long run, to an even less effective provision of judicial protection at 
EU level. 
Such considerations limit considerably the value of the reform proposals and 
plead in favour of the ECJ’s position. The former appear not to take sufficiently 
into consideration that the detour through the national courts has, in fact, an 
                                                 
51 673 cases in 2001: the Court of First Instance completed 275 cases, the Court 398 cases. 
See the Statistics of judicial activity of the European Court of Justice published on the ECJ’s 
Internet site ( http://curia.eu.int/en/pai/rapan.htm). These numbers may not be very impressive 
compared to those of some of the Member States Supreme Courts. However, one has to bear 
in mind that the ECJ (as all institutions of the EU) has to deal with a serious “language problem” 
unknown in other judicial systems. Although the Court itself has one single working language 
(French), all parties and interveners as well as the AGs can submit their observations and 
conclusions in the ten official languages of the EU. Finally, also the Courts’ judgments are to be 
translated into the different languages. Some lawyers appear to exploit this situation by 
submitting very voluminous observations in order to expand the length of the procedures. It may 
perhaps also be useful to recall the wide field of subject matters covered by t he Court 
(according to the Statistics): agriculture, approximation of laws, arbitration clauses, association 
of the overseas countries and territories, commercial policy, common customs tariff, company 
law, competition, culture, customs union, energy, envi ronment and consumers, European 
citizenship, external relations, fisheries policy, foreign and security policy, free movement of 
goods, industrial policy, freedom to provide services, freedom of establishment, freedom of 
movement for persons, intellectual  property, justice and home affairs, law governing the 
institutions, principles of Community of law, regional policy, research, information, education, 
and statistics, social policy, social security for migrant workers, staff regulations, state aid, 
transport, taxation. 
52 In particular the language problem will increase greatly with the next enlargement convened 
upon during the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002. The accession treaties do 
even recognize Maltese as an official language of the Union.   18   
important “filtering function”: applicants have to demonstrate some evidence 
that the incriminated EC act does (or is liable to) violate principles of EC law. 
Moreover, one should also bear in mind that neither the CFI nor AG Jacobs 
advocated for an  actio popularis  at the EU level, which would allow any 
applicant to challenge any EC act. If the only limitation is not to be the two-
month time limit of Article 230 (5) EC,
53 both proposals constituted only a first 
step towards a more liberal re-definition and clarification of the standing 
requirements. Refining the new approach would have necessitated a great 
number of further ECJ judgments – and, hence, much extra work for the Court. 
In the light of the functional limits of the ECJ one cannot deny that relaxing the 
standing requirements would have resulted in overburdening this jurisdiction 
and, thus, likely reducing rather than increasing the efficiency of judicial review 
at the EU level. The Court’s solution avoids such risks. 
2.  Assessing the ECJ’s Approach in UPA 
The functional limits of the ECJ – and perhaps also subsidiarity arguments – 
plead in favour of the ECJ’s solution which combines limited access  to the 
European Courts for individuals with a duty of national courts to grant effective 
judicial protection. 
However, it is submitted that this approach will only work in a satisfactory way 
provided that two conditions are met. First, as acknowledged by the Court itself, 
national courts have to grant effective judicial protection. Second, the ECJ 
should ensure subsidiary judicial protection in those cases in which protection is 
not granted at national level. Although it is doubtful that such a duty can be 
derived from Articles 13, 6 ECHR and Article 6 (2) EU, I would suggest that the 
EU bears, even if one accepts a decentralized system of judicial protection, the 
primary responsibility of granting such protection against its own legal acts. 
                                                 
53 “The proceedings provided for in this article shall be instituted within two months of the 
publication of the measure, or of its notification to the plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the 
day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case may be.”   19   
The ECJ recalled in  UPA its case law  which outlines the duty of sincere 
cooperation (Article 10 EC) along with national procedural law
54 which requires 
Member States to grant individuals the rights of action to challenge the legality 
of any national measure applying EC law.
55 The real question of the case was, 
however, whether this duty also applies to judicial protection against directly 
applicable EC acts. Instead of providing a clear answer, the Court established 
the general principle that  “it is for the Member States to establish a system of 
legal remedies and procedures which ensure respect for the right to effective 
judicial protection.”
56 The ECJ indicated, thus, that it is ready to hold the 
Member States responsible for lacunae in such protection – and perhaps that it 
is also disposed to oblige them, in its future case law, to provide for rights of 
action in national law against directly applicable EC acts.
57 This would – not for 
the first time in the history of the ECJ’s case law – require major changes in the 
procedural law of some Member States.
58 
One can therefore conclude that the ECJ may be ready to ensure that the first 
of the two conditions identified above as necessary for a proper functioning of a 
decentralized system of individual judicial protection will be met: that national 
courts actually grant such protection. 
However, this system should be completed by a kind of “safety net” in the form 
of a subsidiary judicial control of the ECJ in cases in which national courts fail to 
comply with their duty. The UPA judgment does not address this important 
question. 
                                                 
54 See e.g. Case 106/77  Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629; Case 314/85  Foto Frost [1987] ECR 
4199; C -231/89  Factortame  [1990] ECR I -2433; C -92/89  Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen 
[1991] ECR I-415. 
55 Case C-50/00 P UPA at 42: ‘decision[s] or other national measure[s] relative to an application 
to them of a Community act of general application’. 
56 Case C-50/00 P UPA at 41. 
57 Such an obligation would also derive from the ECHR provided the Strasbourg Court 
considers the individuals’ limited access to justice against directly applicable EC measures as 
being contrary to Articles 13 and/or 6 of the Convention. Such a judgment would not be 
addressed to the EC/EU (which is not signatory of the ECHR) but to its Member States. 
58 German law provides e.g. for the Feststellungsklage (§ 43 VwGO) which can be used in order 
to comply with the duty to grant effective judicial protection as noted by M. Nettesheim, 
“Effektive Rechtsschutzgewährleistung im arbeitsteiligen System europäischen 
Rechtsschutzes”, (2002)  Juristenzeitung 928 at 934. Similar solutions exist in English and 
Portuguese law, while the other Member State would have to introduce such a possibility (see 
on this J.C. Moitinho de Almeida, “Le recours en annulation des particuliers”, in O. Due (eds.), 
Festschrift für Ulrich Everling (Nomos, Baden-Baden 1995), 849 et seq. at 868.   20   
3.  UPA: Opting For A – Still Incomplete - Decentralized System of Judicial 
Protection  
If there are good – mainly functional - reasons justifying the ECJ’s choice to 
maintain its restrictive approach towards individuals’ standing under Article 230 
(4) EC and to opt for the traditional decentralized system of judicial protection, 
one has nevertheless to state that this system still appears to be incomplete. 
As noted above, it is not sufficient that the ECJ interprets the duty of sincere 
cooperation in a way which will oblige the national courts to re-interpret – and 
even the Member States legislatures and parliaments to modify – their national 
procedural rules in order to make sure that national judges will be able to grant 
effective judicial protection against EC acts. However, the ECJ should develop 
criteria allowing it to grant subsidiary protection in the case of “Member State 
failure” since the EU bears the primary responsibility to ensure effective judicial 
protection against its own acts. 
Granting subsidiary judicial protection for individuals challenging EC acts raises 
two problems. First, to define the exceptional situation in which such a 
protection has to be granted and, second, to define a less strict interpretation of 
“individual concern” which applies to these exceptional cases. 
The first problem can be resolved in the sense that such an exceptional 
situation can be recognized when the individual has been denied access to the 
national courts. This means, from a practical point of view, that future plaintiffs 
will have to challenge the EC act before both the national court and the CFI in 
order to make sure that their action will not be inadmissible for reasons of delay 
(Article 230 (5) EC); the CFI will in turn only deal w ith that action when the 
national court refuses the individual’s action as inadmissible.
59 
The second problem is more difficult to resolve as it returns to the fundamental 
question to which extent standing requirements have to be softened in order to 
make s ure that effective judicial protection is granted. The “default 
interpretation” of individual concern confirmed in  UPA cannot apply to these 
                                                 
59 This point is also made by M. Nettesheim,  “Effektive Rechtsschutzgewährleistung im 
arbeitsteiligen System europäischen Rechtsschutzes”, (2002) Juristenzeitung 928 at 934.   21   
exceptional cases, in which judicial protection has not been granted by the 
national courts since the ECJ’s strict  approach presupposes, precisely. the 
existence of such a national control. I would suggest that the Court should admit 
in these cases one of the formulae proposed by AG Jacobs and the CFI. Such a 
preferential access to the CFI should, however, only be opened when the 
national court refused to review the individual’s action. Once it has examined 
the question of individual implications of the incriminated EC act, the individual 
has been granted access to justice and does not necessarily need further 
protection by the European Courts.
60 
Such a solution appears to be apposite to a decentralized system of judicial 
protection such as emphasized by the ECJ. Relaxing the standing requirements 
in those cases which have been dismissed as inadmissible by national courts – 
which will be required, more than in the past, to allow the review of EC acts – 
appears to be a fair compromise between the functional limits of the ECJ, on 
the one hand, and the obligation of the EU to grant effective judicial protection 
against its acts, on the other hand. 
 
V.  UPA – Self-restraint or Self-protection ? 
In our previous analysis of the UPA judgment we have exclusively focused on 
its main substantive aspect  – the defense of the ECJ’s restrictive approach 
towards individuals’ standing under Article 230 (4) EC within a still incomplete 
system of decentralized judicial protection. However, this case is also 
interesting under the aspect of the “constitutional dialogue” taking place 
between the ECJ and the pouvoir constituant. In fact, the UPA  judgment is 
exclusively based on one main argument: the limits of the Court’s competences 
(discussed below in subsection 1). This argument, however, is hardly 
convincing (subsection 2). 
1.  The Main Argument of the ECJ: Limits on Its Competences 
                                                 
60 Should individuals be consistently refused access to national judges this would constitute a 
violation of the duty to grant effective judicial review one can derive from the UPA judgment. As 
in the case of continuous breach of Article 234 EC by national courts of last instance, the 
Commission may then file an action against the Member States.   22   
The Court referred twice to limits on its competences, which, following its line of 
thinking, preclude any increased flexibility regarding  the standing requirements 
for individuals. 
Regarding possible exceptions to its strict rule of admissibility in cases of 
appeals against general EC measures applying directly and which, thus, at least 
in principle, cannot be challenged by individuals before national courts, the ECJ 
noted: 
“Such an interpretation would require the Community Court, in each individual 
case, to examine and interpret national procedural law. That would go beyond 
its jurisdiction when reviewing the legality of Community measures.”
61 
As to the reform of the whole system, the Court conceded that:  “… it is, 
admittedly, possible to envisage a system of judicial review of the legality of 
Community measures of general application different from that established by 
the founding Treaty and never amended as to its principles,” but then stated 
that “it is for the Member States, if necessary, in accordance with Article 48 EU, 
to reform the system currently in force.”
62 
2.  The Shortcomings of the Court’s Reasoning in UPA 
Both branches of the Court’s “limits of competences” argument are flawed. 
The ECJ’s conception of a decentralized system of judicial review should n ot 
exclusively be built on the obligation imposed on national courts to secure 
effective judicial protection for individuals against EC acts. Such a system would 
better accommodate concerns of effective judicial review if the ECJ were ready 
to grant subsidiary judicial protection when the national courts fail to comply 
with this duty. Only in such exceptional cases, should the Court  - being 
ultimately responsible for securing the judicial review of EC acts  - relax its 
traditional standing criteria. 
Such a – limited but desirable – liberalization of the ECJ’s case law on Article 
230 (4) EC does not require the Community Courts to examine and interpret, in 
                                                 
61 Case C-50/00 P UPA at 43. 
62 Case C-50/00 P UPA  at 45.   23   
each individual case, national procedural law. The plaintiff will have simply to 
demonstrate that the national court has rejected the action as inadmissible. One 
can hardly see how verifying this formal requirement will force the EU judges to 
enter into an interpretation of national law and to overstep their competences. 
This limited extent of the reform - which should ensure that the decentralized 
system of judicial review advocated by the ECJ meets the principle of access to 
justice - also casts serious doubts on the Court’s assertion, according to which, 
any change of its case law would amount to a “substantive modification” of the 
Treaty’s system of judicial review. However, even admitting this point, one has 
to ask whether such a “substantive” modification indeed requires a formal 
Treaty revision or not. The ECJ’s own case law on Article 230 EC suggests a 
negative answer. 
Taking the Court’s “limits of competences”-argument in the  UPA judgment 
seriously, the ECJ would not have been competent to endorse the various 
(although modest) liberalization of the standing requirements for individuals, as 
it did e.g. in Codorniu.
63 The same applies to several substantial modifications 
to the system of judicial review established by the founding Treaty which have 
resulted from  the ECJ’s case law; the most famous example of such a 
“dynamic interpretation” in this field being the Chernobyl case.
64 This judgment 
conferred to the EP a limited right of standing, which was absent in the former 
EEC Treaty, in order to secure a “fundamental interest”
65 of the Community. 
One can, thus, hardly see why a limited liberalization of standing requirements 
aimed at maximizing access of individuals to justice in the decentralized EC 
system of judicial review could not also be accomplished by means of judicial 
interpretation. 
Should one, thus, read the UPA case as a new element in the Court’s move 
away from a “law maker” stature and towards a judicial restraint approach? 
There is an important objection to such an understanding: in line with other 
judgments based on the duty of sincere cooperation,  the ECJ has expanded 
                                                 
63 Case C-309/89 Codorniu [1994] ECR I-1853. See for this argument also AG Jacobs in Case 
C-50/00 P UPA at 83. 
64 Case C-70/88 EP/Council [1990] ECR I-2041 
65 In the maintenance and observance of the institutional balance, see Case C -70/88 
EP/Council [1990] ECR I-2041 at 25.   24   
considerably the scope of Article 10 EC which appears to comprise, since UPA, 
a far-reaching obligation of the Member States to secure judicial protection 
against EC acts.
66 
This suggests that the ECJ’s “limits of competences”-discourse was not really 
concerned with preserving Member States’ competences. It appears that its 
objective was to “constitutionalize” its own traditional  – and unnecessarily 
restrictive – interpretation of Article 230 (4) EC and to insulate this approach 
from any further reform attempt by means of judicial interpretation. One may, 
thus, conclude that UPA was not so much about confirming the ECJ’s trend 
towards a less “dynamic” interpretation of Treaty provisions but that the Court 
used  judicial self-restraint  language in order to stall the judicial debate on 
relaxing standing requirements for individuals within the European Courts. 
 
D.  The UPA Judgment in the Context of the Constitutional Reform Process 
Although one cannot interpret the UPA judgment as constituting a new example 
of judicial self-restraint, it is perhaps not necessarily to be read as a case of 
self-protection if one takes into account the particular political context in which 
the Court was to deliver its judgment: the permanent  constitutional reform 
process. This process has to some extent changed the framework in which the 
“constitutional dialogue” between the ECJ and the pouvoir constituant takes 
place. 
 
I.  The Acceleration of Treaty Reform “Cycles” and the Enhanced Public Debate 
on Constitutional Reform 
The first treaty reform was the Single European Act which entered into force 30 
years after the signature of the original EEC Treaty.
67 Since then the treaty 
                                                 
66 See the case law quoted supra at note 54. 
67 Although one should remember that the founding Treaties h ave already earlier been 
amended/modified by the Merger Treaty, various Accession Agreements, the Treaties on 
Certain Budgetary and Financial Provisions, or the Act on direct and universal suffrage of the 
EP (although on the basis of a particular Treaty amendment procedure).   25   
reform “cycles” have been constantly “speeded-up”: Maastricht 1992, 
Amsterdam 1997, Nice 2000. All these amending treaties  - but also the 
accession agreements concluded in 1994 with Austria, Sweden and Finland - 
were characterized by the time consuming processes of preparation, 
negotiation and ratification.  Moreover, the Treaties of Maastricht,
68 
Amsterdam
69 and also the recently ratified Treaty of Nice
70 contain “rendez-
vous-clauses” which convene a new IGC. All this has led to a new situation in 
which the constitutional reform process has become permanent.
71 
The next IGC is to be held in 2004.
72 However, the present stage of the 
constitutional reform process differs from previous ones as the next IGC is not 
to be prepared exclusively by more or less closed diplomatic circles, which are 
dominated by government representatives. This is now mainly the task of a 
“Convention of the future of Europe.” Although the Convention is formally only a 
“working assembly” charged with elaborating proposals to be considered by the 
next IGC, its composition (the majority of whom are parliamentarians) and its 
working method (publicity, participation of experts and of interest groups) has 
considerably broadened the number of participants in the EU’s “constitutional 
dialogue.” This is particularly the case for the European and national 
parliamentarians. They are given a public political forum, which affords them 
considerably more influence over the content of the reform than in they enjoyed 
in the past when they were limited to different forms of informal persuasion 
through their national governments.
73 
In short, preparing, negotiating, concluding and ratifying Treaty  revisions has 
become a permanent feature of the EU and this constitutional revision process. 
The use of the Convention marks a new stage in this process and has 
                                                 
68 Art. N (2) EU (Maastricht), “Protocol on the institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the 
European Union” annexed (Amsterdam), “Declaration No. 23 on the future of the Union” (Nice). 
69 See the “Protocol on the institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the European Union”. 
70 Declaration No. 23 on the future of the Union. 
71 See for a concise description De Witte (note 7) at 42/43 using the more cautious term “semi-
permanent treaty revision process”. 
72 According to Declaration No. 23. It is, however, still possible that it will be held under the 
Italian Presidency in the second semester of 2003. 
73 The MEPs on the sole basis of their arguments, national MPs (from countries in which 
ratification does not require a referendum) by threatening to refuse approval at the later stage of 
the national ratification process.   26   
considerably widened the possibilities of various political “players” to participate 
in the “constitutional dialogue.” 
 
II.  Implications for the ECJ 
This radical change of the political context since the early 1990s has profoundly 
affected the ECJ’s position as a participant in the “constitutional dialogue.” 
In order to measure the importance of this change, it may be useful to 
remember that the ECJ’s “law maker approach” was based on two 
interconnected premises. First, the Court operated from the premise that the 
Treaty had established an autonomous legal order in spite of the fact that it 
contained some important lacunae. Second, the Treaty was to be interpreted 
accordingly and loopholes were to be filled by means of judicial interpretation – 
at least as far as this was not done by the Community law makers and/or the 
“Masters of the Treaty” (both being, to a large extent, identical under the regime 
of the Luxembourg compromise). Their “failure to act”  – the “ carence du 
législateur” (Judge Pesactore) – justified, during many years, the ECJ’s “law-
making” approach. 
Following this line of argumentation, the ECJ’s margin for “law making” was 
logically to decrease the more the pouvoir constituant was itself tackling the 
problem of “constitution building”. As already noted, the “Masters of the Treaty” 
have well accepted and even codified most of the “constitutional pillars” built up 
by the ECJ. However, they have also shown some signs of scepticism in 
particular by limiting  the Court’s powers in the new fields of competences 
conferred to the Union. 
The appearance of the pouvoir constituant as a permanently  present player 
since the beginning of the 1990s reduced, hence, the ECJ’s role in the 
“constitutional dialogue”. More than in the past, the Court is to limit its “law-
making” role to those fields and issues in which it could expect that its   27   
contributions w ere to be accepted by the Member States. This explains 
judgments such as Keck, Opinion 1/94 and Ban of Tobacco Advertising.
74 
If the ECJ had, thus, to some extent, lowered its powerful voice by choosing in 
determined, particular sensible cases a  judicial-restraint  approach, it 
nonetheless uses a “softer” instrument in order to participate in the 
“constitutional dialogue”: written contributions to the IGCs.
75 In the context of the 
UPA case, it is particularly interesting to note that the ECJ had invited, in its 
contribution to the IGC 1996/97, the pouvoir constituant to consider a reform of 
Article 230 (4) EC.
76 The latter preferred, however, not to deal with the topic. 
The formal participation of the ECJ as an institution in the Convention’s work is, 
however, limited. The Presidium of the Convention can invite the President of 
the Court “to address the Convention.”
77 Individual members of the ECJ can 
also be invited to hearings in order to express their opinion on specific aspects 
of the constitutional reform.
78 Such opinions of individual members of the Court 
can furthermore also be submitted by members of the Convention as their own 
contribution: this happened, e.g. with a note prepared by AG Jacobs “on 
                                                 
74 This development has been early anticipated by J.H.H. Weiler. See ‘The Transformation of 
Europe’ 100 (1991) Yale Law Journal 2403 et seq. This author has, thus, proposed to adapt the 
institutional landscape this new situation and to create a Conseil constitutionnel for the Union 
composed by national constitutional or supreme judges chaired by the President of the ECJ 
(see J.H.H. Weiler, “ICG 2002: The Constitutional Agenda”, in E. Best etc. (eds.), Rethinking the 
European Union – ICG 2000 and Beyond (EIPA, Maastricht 2000) 219 at 235. Such proposals 
have been discussed in the European Convention’s Working Group I on Subsidiarity (in the 
context of a possible creation of a “chamber of competences/subsidiarity” ) but have finally not 
been retained in the group’s conclusions. It is, thus, unlikely that they will find their way in the 
Convention’s proposal for a new treaty. 
75 Some of them can be found on the Court’s Website at 
http://curia.eu.int/en/txts/intergov/index.htm . 
76  Report of the Court of Justice on Certain Aspects of the Application of the Treaty on 
European Union (May 1995) at 11 
77 See  Laeken Declaration (at 
http://europe.eu.int/futurum/documents/offtext/doc151201_en.htm). The President of the Court 
has been invited to do so in a special Working Group, the “Discussion  Circle Court of Justice”. 
See the oral presentation by Judge Rodríguez Iglesias, CONV 572/03, Working Document 6, 10 
March 2003. Also the President of the CFI has been heard, see the oral presentation by Judge 
Vesterdorf, CONV 575/03, 10 March 2003 (both at http://european-convention.eu.int). 
78 Accordingly Judge  Skouris has delivered an opinion on the incorporation of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights into the Treaties (see Working Group II, Working Document 19, 17 
September 2002) and Judge Lenaerts on the simplification of the EU’s instruments see Working 
Group IX, Working Document 7, 6 November 2002. These documents are available at 
http://european-convention.eu.int .   28   
necessary changes to the system of judicial remedies.”
79 This latter example 
demonstrates clearly that such opinions made by individual members of the 
ECJ can hardly be considered as contributions of the Court as an institution. 
 
III.  Assessing UPA in Light of the Changing Context in which the “Constitutional 
Dialogue” Between the ECJ and the Pouvoir Constituant Takes Place 
In the light of the new context in which the “constitutional dialogue” between the 
ECJ and the pouvoir constituant takes place, it is possible to assess differently 
the Court’s assertion regarding the limits of its competences in the  UPA 
judgment. 
First, UPA can be read as a renewal of the ECJ’s invitation to the “Masters of 
the Treaty,” initially formulated in its contribution to the IGC 1996/97, to 
reconsider a reform of the system of judicial r eview as established by the 
Treaties and subsequently interpreted in the Court’s case law. 
Second, UPA appears to acknowledge that the Court’s margin of manœuvre for 
“law-making” has been reduced by fact that it has to act within the particular 
political context of a permanent constitutional reform process. 
From this follows a third consideration, namely, that the ECJ does not believe 
that the pouvoir constituant has already “failed to act” although it has chosen to 
ignore its invitation to address the question of individual standing before the 
European Courts. This makes clear that stating a “ carence du législateur” in 
times of permanent constitutional re-adaptation is much more problematic than 
it has been in the first decades of the EC characterized by a  stable 
constitutional framework. Moreover, the ECJ was to decide the question of 
individual access to justice at a critical moment in which the reform process was 
just entering into a new qualitative phase: on the one hand, the choice for the 
“convention method” broadened considerably the number of participants in the 
“constitutional dialogue,” increasing thereby the democratic legitimacy of this 
                                                 
79 See Working Group II, Working Document 20, 27 September 2002, contribution from B. Fayot 
(at http://european-convention.eu.int).   29   
discourse; on the other hand, the mandate of the Convention is nearly 
unlimited. 
It follows that the Court’s decision in  UPA not to proceed to a substantive 
change of its approach towards individuals’ standing under Article 230 (4) EC 
takes perfectly into account these new circumstances. Given the broad 
mandate of the Convention composed in its large majority by democratically 
accountable “players” it would have been very unwise to intervene by judicial 
means in a question which the Court has “marked,” some years ago, as a 
“political” one to be addressed by the pouvoir constituant. Moreover, one may 
guess that the ECJ used its relatively strong  - in another context rather 
unconvincing - “limits of competences”-argument in order to put the question 
again on the reform agenda. 
If this was the Court’s intention, it has succeeded: one day after the ECJ’s 
judgment in  UPA,  the European Ombudsman made a reform proposal.
80 
Relaxation of standing requirements for individuals was then discussed in the 
Convention’s working group dealing with specific aspects of fundamental 
rights.
81 In its final report, the group acknowledges that  “a certain lacuna of 
protection might exist” but agreed that “the present overall system of remedies, 
and the ‘division of work’ between Community and national courts it entails, 
should not be profoundly altered by a possible reform.”
82 The group considered 
that the question “certainly has a nexus with fundamental rights” and 
“commends the possible reform of Article 230 §4 TEC, together with the 
valuable contributions admitted thereon, for further examination by the 
Convention.” 
                                                 
80 J. Söderman, “Proposals for Treaty changes” (CONV 221/02, 26 July 2002 at http://european-
convention.eu.int). Already before  - some days after the publication of  Jégo-Quéré  -  H. 
Farnleitner had presented a reform proposal to the Convention (see “Facilitating individual 
action before the ECJ and the CFI”, CONV 45/02, 14 May 2002). 
81 The group worked on the modalities and consequences of an incorporation of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights into the Treaty and of an accession of the Union to the ECHR. On 
individual’s standing see the proposal made by  J. Meyer, Contribution to Working Group II 
(Working Document 17, 16 September 2002, available at:  http://european-convention.eu.int) 
and the contributions of Judge Skouris (note 78) and AG Jacobs (note 79). 
82 Final report of Working Group II (CONV 354/02, 22 October 2002) at 15/16 (available at: 
http://european-convention.eu.int).   30   
The issue was debated, some months later, in a special Working Group of the 
Convention called “Discussion Circle on the Court of Justice”.
83 Its members 
discussed several possible reforms
84 and heard the European Courts’ 
presidents.
85 The Discussion Circle reached consensus on reforming Article 230 
EC in the sense that locus standi should be granted to an individual challenging 
a regulatory EC act “which is of direct concern to him without entailing 
implementing measures”
86. However, its members remained divided on the 
question of whether  or not to extend such protection to “an act of general 
application”.
87 It is, thus, to be expected that a limited  – but nevertheless 
significant - liberalization will be proposed by the Convention to the next IGC. 
 
E.  Conclusion 
In sum, the UPA judgment can neither be entirely understood as being a new 
example in line with previous cases following a judicial-restraint approach nor 
                                                 
83 This “Circle” was set up by the Praesidium of the Convention since “some Convention 
members felt that there was a need to look seriously at the implications that certain proposals 
made within the Convention might have for the operation of the Courts of Justice. (…) This 
circle should in particular look at matters on which the Convention has not yet adopted fixed 
positions and could explore the following points amongst others: … (d) Should the wording of 
the forth paragraph of Article 230 EC concerning direct appeals by individuals against general 
acts of the institutions be amended? …”. The mandate has been annexed to the Circle’s final 
report (CONV 636/03, Circle 1, Working Document 13, 25 March 2003, available at 
http://european-convention.eu.int). 
84 See Note of the Convention’s secretariat, Cercle 1, Working Document 1, 26 February 2003 
available at http://european-convention.eu.int. 
85 The Court’s presidents have, however, been rather cautious. Both pointed out that the 
possible reform is first and foremost a policy choice and also closely linked to the restructuring 
of the sources of Community law. However, while  Judge  Rodríguez Iglesias stated that “the 
Court considers that the current system, which is based on the principle of subsidiarity in that 
the national courts in particular are responsible for protecting the rights of individuals, satisfies 
the requirements essential for the effective judicial protection of those rights, including 
fundamental rights” ( see CONV 572/03, Working Document 6, 10 March 2003, 3, 
http://european-convention.eu.int), Judge Vesterdorf reported “that opinion among the Members 
of the CFI is divided as to whether the judicial protection afforded to individuals by Article 230 
EC is adequate” ( see CONV 572/03, 10 March 2003, 3, http://european-convention.eu.int). In 
the event that judicial protection under Article 230 (4) EC would be increased, Judge Rodríguez 
Iglesias suggested that “it would seem appropriate to continue to take a restrictive approach to 
actions by individuals against legislative measures and to provide a more open approach with 
regard to actions against regulatory measures” (see CONV 572/03, 4). 
86 See Final Report of the Discussion Circle on the Court of Justice, CONV 636/03, Circle 1, 
Working Document 13, 25 March 2003, 7 (available at http://european-convention.eu.int). 
87  See Final Report (previous note) at 8, which reflects the reservations made by Judge 
Rodríguez Iglesias quoted in note 84.   31   
as a mere act of  self-protection  by which the ECJ aims at insulating its 
traditional restrictive conception of individual standing under Article 230 (4) EC. 
UPA marks the Court’s use, for the first time, of a new kind of voice in its 
“constitutional dialogue” with the Union’s pouvoir constituant. This development 
coincides with the entry into the next phase of the European integration process 
which adopts a new method of constitutional reform, the “convention method.” 
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